Azarbaijan Press News ; Freydoon Khoie ; Iran’s dictatorship regime grabbed global headlines in recent days by threatening to close the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world's traded oil passes. Khamnei, Iran’s dictator sought to back up its threats by holding a 10-day military exercise in the Persian Gulf and warning the recently-departed USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group not to return to the area. The United States and European Union have brushed aside Iran's warnings, vowing to maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf and proceeding with plans to impose sanctions on regime's oil trade.

This heated back-and-forth has roiled global oil markets and led to heightened speculation about a U.S.-Iran military confrontation. The following is an interview with Freydoon Khoie, one of the leaders of the opposition Pro Democracy Movement about the rising rhetoric.

COULD IRAN ACTUALLY CLOSE THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

It is unlikely that Khamnei’s regime could close the Strait for a meaningful period of time. Any effort to seize control of the Strait would meet swift and determined resistance from the U.S. Navy, with the support of U.S. allies in the region and beyond. Khamnei's regular navy and air force are no match for their U.S. counterparts; both would almost certainly be dispatched quickly in any outright confrontation. Recognizing this, Khamnei’s regime is more likely to use the asymmetric warfare capabilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy to disrupt shipping through the Strait and to harass U.S. forces. The Revolutionary Guards could use small boats (either individually or in "swarms"); influence mines (which do not require that a ship run into them); midget submarines; anti-ship cruise missiles; and even divers. These tactics could be a nuisance, but they are also unlikely to shutter the Strait. Yet they would probably provoke a strong U.S. response.

WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES OF KHAMNEI’S REGIME ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE STRAIT?

Khamnei is unlikely to try to close the Strait for several reasons. The regime surely recognizes its military disadvantage; it is also cognizant of its own dependence on the Strait. About 70 percent of regime's revenues are generated by oil exports, all of which must transit the Strait. This fact alone would make a preemptive effort to close the Strait self-defeating.

If Khamnei nevertheless sought to close the Strait -- say, in response to an oil embargo rather than preemptively -- the consequences would extend well beyond the mere military setback of the United States then forcibly reopening the passage. Global oil prices may sharply increase, though the extent and duration of this increase would depend on the scope and intensity of the conflict and the speed with which the United States could assert dominance in the Gulf.

The United States, the presumable target of Khamnei’s regime move against the Strait, would probably suffer like the rest of the world from the effects of rising oil prices. But U.S. oil supplies would not be meaningfully imperiled. The United States imports 49 percent of the petroleum it consumes, and only 25 percent of those imports come from the Persian Gulf, far less than is available in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. China, however, is heavily dependent on Gulf oil sources, particularly from Saudi Arabia. China also happens to be Khamnei’s largest oil customer and provides the Mullah’s regime with critical support in the form of weapons sales and diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Khamnei can ill afford to anger Beijing.

Khamnei would also need to consider the likelihood that the United States and its allies would not stop at reopening the Strait in response to regime’s attempt to close it; they might also target nuclear and military installations on the Iranian mainland and perhaps even seek to topple the tyrannical regime. The impediments to a preemptive U.S. attack -- including uncertainty about the aftermath, worries about oil markets, and the desire for diplomatic support -- would be rendered largely moot by regime offensive in the Persian Gulf.

As a result of these factors, Khamnei’s effort to close the Strait of Hormuz would likely have devastating strategic consequences for the despotic regime.

WHAT IS KHAMNEI'S AIM, THEN, IN THREATENING TO CLOSE THE STRAIT AND ATTACK U.S. FORCES?

The Mullah’s regime like the North Koreans and other tyrannical regime are shaky and unstable and understands that rattling a saber can be more beneficial than actually using it. Khamnei's bellicose rhetoric and behavior is aimed at both domestic and international audiences.

Inside Iran, the regime is deeply hated by 90% of the Iranian people and has struggled with internal divisions, a growing (if temporarily suppressed)Pro Democracy opposition movement and, perhaps most urgently, a crumbling economy. The regime may calculate that provoking tensions externally can divert domestic attention from these crises but there is little evidence that it is succeeding. Indeed, these actions has proved counterproductive domestically, as the pro democracy movement accuse it of increasingly reckless and damaging policies. In my opinion, hard-line groups in Iran -- for example, the Revolutionary Guards -- may want an actual (albeit limited) conflict to consolidate their domestic control. But so far, the regime has preferred leveling threats and working through proxies to maintain plausible deniability.

Externally, Khamnei may hope that its actions will produce several responses that will prove useful. First, it is relying on the United States to demonstrate restraint to avoid conflict. Khamnei’s revolutionary guards has engaged in brazen provocations in recent years -- including mock attacks on U.S. vessels, the seizure of Western hostages, and attacks on U.S. targets -- that have provoked limited Western response. This restraint -- along with the uncertainty about the U.S. regional posture after withdrawal from Iraq -- may prove counterproductive by feeding Khamnei’s commanders' sense of impunity.

Second, Khamnei’s regime almost certainly understands that Western countries are worried about an increase in global oil prices at a fragile time for the global economy. Despotic regime's actions are meant to sharpen these fears by increasing oil prices in the near-term and holding out the prospect for sharper increases down the road. The regime's hope, presumably, is that oil-dependent countries -- both consumers and producers -- will focus on defusing the current crisis rather than on regime's nuclear program, and may delay plans to sanction regime's oil exports or even urge the United States to reduce its military posture in the Persian Gulf. But the United States and European Union have thus far refused to play along, brushing off Khamnei's threats and moving forward with oil sanctions and embargo.

I have repeatedly called upon the United States and EU leaders to seriously consider overt Regime Change in Iran as the only solution to the entire turmoil in Iran, Middle East and even North African countries, because of hard-liner mullah’s constant provocations in all Muslim and Arab countries. The situation inside Iran is truly explosive with over 30% unemployment, 20 years of negative economic growth, brutal repression and gross violation of human rights on massive scale, totally isolated and loathed by most of the people in the world, 95% of the population remain vehemently against Khamnei’s bloody dictatorship and they will not rest until Khamnei’s regime has fallen, brought to justice for crimes against humanity and Iran’s pro democracy leaders are back in the country to start building a free, secular democratic, free market economy and civilized nation which is in peace with all the countries of the world.

 

 

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